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 Tool Use and Causal Cognition 
 An Introduction 
 Teresa  McCormack , Christoph  Hoerl , and  Stephen  Butterfi ll 
 Why study tool use if you are interested in causal cognition? Take an everyday example 
of a tool, such as a spoon, a hammer, or even a coin used to loosen a screw because no 
screwdriver is to hand (all examples taken from chapters in this volume). Generally, 
whether a tool is useful for a given end, and how it should be used to reach that end 
eff ectively, will depend on particular physical properties of the tool and the targets of its 
application, as well as on basic causal-mechanical principles connecting these properties. 
A question running through the chapters in this volume is to what extent, and in what 
senses, tool users themselves need to be sensitive to, or engage in causal reasoning about, 
these properties and principles. One of the hard issues on causal cognition concerns 
identifying its varieties and how diff erent varieties of causal cognition interact in 
enabling individuals or groups to manipulate and explain their environment. Studies of 
tool use provide some new hypotheses and fresh directions on issues such as this, as this 
volume demonstrates. 
 One specifi c way of bringing out what is special about approaching causal cognition 
through the study of tool use is by looking at two other ways in which aspects of our 
ability to learn about or become aware of causal relations have been studied empirically. 
 It is a striking fact about the literature in experimental psychology on causal learning 
that many of the experiments are deliberately set in contexts in which substantive back-
ground knowledge about how the world works is not relevant or useful. There is a good 
reason for this: often researchers have been concerned with testing models of causal 
learning that assume such learning in one way or another involves the detection of 
statistical information about the covariation of putative causes and eff ects. To test such 
models, the experimenter needs to control the nature of the statistical information that 
participants are exposed to, and he or she will usually remove other factors that may 
impact on causal judgments over and above such information. Of course, some research-
ers do consider how sensitivity to statistical information may interact with knowledge 
of particular substantive causal principles regarding, e.g., interactions between physical 
objects (or indeed lead to the acquisition of such knowledge). However, the underlying 
assumption in this area of research often seems to be that if we can appropriately model 
the detection of the relevant statistical information, we will have got to the heart of how 
causal relationships are learned. 
01-McCormack-Ch-01.indd   1 8/9/2011   9:33:02 AM
2 t. mccormack, c. hoerl, and s. butterfill
 There is another, quite diff erent, strand of research in experimental psychology that 
focuses on the perception of causation. This research follows the Michottean tradition 
of establishing the circumstances in which participants will report perceiving two events 
to be causally related to each other (Michotte,  1946 ). Participants in such experiments 
are shown events in which objects move in spatiotemporal patterns highly controlled 
by the experimenter and asked to judge, for example, whether the movement of one 
object was caused by the movement of another (e.g., Choi & Scholl,  2005 ; White & 
Milne,  1997 ). Typically, experimenters have examined in detail how such judgments are 
aff ected by spatiotemporal parameters of the events that are observed. Research in this 
tradition has primarily focussed on simple collision events in which no information 
about the mechanics of the scenario other than the eff ects of object collision is relevant. 
 Studies of tool use stand in stark contrast to both of these research traditions. Rather 
than focusing on the detection of statistical information, the tasks involved in studying 
tool use are not designed to exclude substantive causal knowledge regarding the behav-
ior of physical objects. Instead of stripping the physics out of the research paradigms, 
tool use studies potentially put knowledge of causal-mechanical principles at centre 
stage. Tool use studies also diff er from studies of perceptual causation in that the partici-
pants (be they adults, children, or non-human animals) are not passively observing 
objects interact, but handling objects themselves. Moreover, objects are being used in 
such studies, for the most part, in the service of the participants’ goals: participants are 
trying to do things with the tools they are using. These facts about tool use studies mean 
that the sets of issues they generate are in some cases quite diff erent from the sets of issues 
generated by other sorts of studies of causal cognition. For a start, the issue of whether 
tool use requires sensitivity to physical principles, and of what sort, is at the centre of 
debates about the extent to which tool use requires genuine causal understanding or 
reasoning (see contributions in this volume by Goldenberg, Seed and colleagues, 
Peacocke, and Povinelli and Penn). Moreover, if causal cognition is involved in tool use, 
it is, literally in most cases, a “hands-on” sort of causal cognition.  As Greif and Needham 
highlight in their chapter, it is common in the psychological literature to actually defi ne 
a tool as something that is an “extension of the body that expands the functional range 
of a limb.”  This in itself raises interesting further issues that don’t arise in other para-
digms studying causal cognition, such as how tool use may aff ect representations of the 
body and personal space (see chapters by Spence and by Cardinali et al.). 
 On a theoretical level, the specifi c signifi cance that research on tool use might have 
within the context of studies of causal cognition might helpfully be connected to a dis-
tinction between two notions of causation, which Woodward, in his chapter, calls the 
diff erence-making and the geometrical-mechanical notion, respectively (see Peacocke’s 
chapter for related discussion). Put in those terms, the distinction, which has its origins 
in discussions about the metaphysics of causation, may not be immediately familiar to 
psychologists. However, as Woodward points out, we can in fact also conceive of it as a 
distinction on the level of what it is to represent or understand causality, which connects 
more directly with work in psychology. Geometrical-mechanical accounts describe 
causation in terms of a physical process connecting cause and eff ect. Related ideas have 
been cashed out in various diff erent ways within psychology, with perhaps the most 
salient recent example being Wolff ’s ( 2007 ) characterization of causal representation in 
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terms of force dynamics. Shultz’s ( 1982 ) seminal work on children’s causal reasoning also 
stems from an approach of this type, with Shultz arguing that children make causal judg-
ments on the basis of a grasp of the notion of “force transmission.” On this type of 
account, causal representation puts to work a grasp of basic principles of mechanical 
interactions, and indeed it has been explicitly claimed that the notion of a mechanism 
connecting cause and eff ect is itself at the core of causal cognition. Moreover, as 
Woodward points out, it has been claimed that “the concepts and principles deployed in 
recognition and understanding of mechanical interactions serve as the basis for more 
general notions of causation and causal mechanism.” For example, Wolff  ( 2007 ) argues 
that psychological causation is, at its most basic level, understood in terms of principles 
of force dynamics that stem from how mechanical interactions are understood. If this 
is one’s general approach to causal representation it is easy to see that tool use studies 
might be thought of as an ideal context in which to examine causal abilities. Put simply, 
one might think that tool use is the basic situation in which this sort of understanding 
of mechanical interactions is being put to work, and that studies of tool use should 
focus on teasing out the precise way in which it is underpinned by or involves a grasp 
of mechanical principles. Thus, on this view, tool use studies reveal the most basic type 
of causal understanding being put to use, in a way that studies that focus on learning 
statistical relationships between cause and eff ect or studies of perceptual causation 
do not. 
 The contrasting approach to causation is what Woodward terms a diff erence-making 
approach. On this approach, a cause is understood to be something that makes a diff erence 
to whether or not an eff ect occurs, with the notion of diff erence-making being spelt 
out in a variety of ways. On his own, interventionist, approach, A causes B if there is 
a relationship between A and B that remains invariant under interventions. Clearly, what 
exactly this comes to, and in particular how exactly the notion of an intervention is to 
be understood, needs to be spelled out in much more detail (see Woodward,  2003 ). But, as 
Woodward puts it, “interventionist accounts attempt to capture in this way the common-
sense idea that causes can be thought of as ‘handles’ for manipulating and controlling 
their eff ects.” Indeed, recently, some psychologists have also suggested that what it is to 
represent a relationship as causal is not a matter of assuming that there is a mechanism 
connecting cause and eff ect, but a matter of representing what would happen to the eff ect 
if certain interventions were to be carried out on the cause (see in particular, Schulz 
et al.,  2007 ). Moreover, the general idea suggested by diff erence-making accounts — that 
learning whether a relationship is causal may often involve using information about the 
likelihood of the eff ect occurring in the presence and absence of the purported cause—
is, as Woodward points out, at the heart of many traditional studies of contingency learn-
ing. In such studies, experimental psychologists deliberately present participants with 
exactly this sort of statistical information. Yet, in these types of studies participants are 
typically passive observers of events and do not themselves intervene to fi x the values of 
variables (there are some notable exceptions to this; see e.g., Sobel & Kushnir,  2006 ; 
Steyvers et al.,  2003 ). Studies of tool use might, by contrast, be thought to be of particular 
interest in the context of diff erence-making approaches to causation such as interven-
tionism, because they provide circumstances in which participants are actively trying to 
intervene on the world in the service of their particular goals. Tool use could potentially 
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be seen as making use in action of the information or knowledge one holds about 
diff erence-making relations involving physical objects. 
 There are, then, a variety of reasons for thinking that studies of tool use should be of 
particular interest within the context of research on causal cognition. Yet, at the same 
time, there might also be grounds for arguing that such studies are in fact only of limited 
value in assessing the extent to which an individual can actually engage in anything that 
deserves to be called genuine causal reasoning or understanding. For instance, the very 
fact that tool use studies directly assess forms of practical, goal-directed behavior raises 
issues about the sophistication of the cognitive abilities underpinning tool use. Thus, 
one can query whether this sort of purely practical ability necessarily requires any type 
of reasoning about the causal relations involved (e.g., see discussion in this volume by 
Woodward, Peacocke, Penn and Povinelli, and Seed and colleagues). 
 Edwards et al. also argue in their chapter that tool use studies are potentially less useful 
to animal researchers interested in causal cognition than studies employing methodolo-
gies that have been used to examine causal structure learning in humans (and in young 
children in particular, e.g., Gopnik et al.,  2001 ; Kushnir & Gopnik,  2007 ). Moreover, they 
argue that it is the latter methodologies, rather than those involved in tool use studies, 
that level the playing fi eld between humans and animals in the domain of research on 
causal cognition. In one of their studies, monkeys are presented with sets of objects and 
shown patterns of covariation between the presence or absence of individual objects or 
pairs of objects and the presence or absence of a certain outcome, i.e., a detector only 
activates when certain objects are placed on it. (They also compare the monkeys’ perfor-
mance on this task with that of children on a similar one.) The measure of interest in 
Edwards et al.’s studies is whether the monkeys will arrive at the appropriate judgments 
as to which objects possess the causal power to set off  the detector, as indexed by their 
tendency to place the relevant objects on the detector to receive a food reward. It is 
perhaps useful to spell out one very obvious but crucial diff erence between such 
methodologies and those of tool use studies. In the studies described by Edwards et al., 
monkeys have a goal (to obtain one or more grapes) and are sensitive in some way both 
to the causal powers of objects and to the fact that placing them on a piece of apparatus 
is necessary for achieving their goals. Thus, these studies assess goal-directed non-verbal 
behavior. However, although obtaining the reward depends on using an object appropri-
ately, it seems intuitively wrong to classify this as an instance of tool use. One particular 
background intuition that may be at work here is refl ected in some existing defi nitions 
of tool use (e.g., Goldenberg & Iriki,  2007 ) that restrict talk about tool use to cases in 
which an object is used to alter the spatial location or arrangement of a target, as when a 
hook is used to drag an object, or a hammer to drive in a nail (see Campbell’s chapter for 
more detailed discussion). 
 Perhaps even more to the point, though, in Edwards et al.’s study, sensitivity to the 
causal powers of the objects in question would seem to be completely detached 
from any substantive knowledge about the nature of the objects and the detector itself. 
There are no apparent physical principles, over and above the basic physical contact 
between object and detector, that are relevant to the causal status of the objects in the 
experiment. Thus, the monkeys can be seen as in a situation parallel to that described by 
Campbell in his chapter, in which someone learns that a gadget opens a set of curtains 
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and thus can operate the curtains, but has no idea as to the underlying mechanics of the 
situation that underpin the pattern of covariation that they have observed. Of course, 
whether this is important depends critically on how one wishes to characterize the 
nature of causal cognition. It is interesting to note that in the parallel studies with chil-
dren in which this type of paradigm has been used, researchers have then gone on to 
examine whether children seem to have assumptions about whether the causal powers 
of the objects are related to their  internal (in contrast to external) appearance. For exam-
ple, David Sobel has examined whether children assume that objects with similarly 
colored insides, rather than outsides, are more likely to have similar causal status with 
regards to whether they set off  a detector (Sobel et al.,  2007 ). The underlying notion of a 
causal mechanism guiding such studies is the idea that causal mechanisms are tied to 
object properties that are typically “hidden” from view and must be discovered or inferred 
indirectly. It can be seen immediately that given this guiding conception of causal 
mechanisms, tool use is not an interesting context in which to study causal cognition. 
This is because in nearly all studies of tool use, the causally relevant spatial and physical 
properties of tools and targets are not concealed from perception (though this leaves 
scope for further debate as to whether they should be classifi ed as directly observable 
properties, which is an issue we will return to below in the context of discussing the 
chapters by Povinelli and Penn, and by Seed and colleagues). 
 In fact, Edwards et al. argue against tool use as a marker for causal cognition for a 
diff erent reason: what they take to be important to demonstrate is that participants must 
fi gure out sets of causal relationships in a system of causally related variables. Thus, in line 
with a number of other theorists, they see the ability to sort out causes from eff ects and 
fi gure out the (potentially complex) nature of such relationships in order to form a 
 causal model of a system as being at the heart of causal cognition (see also Gopnik et al., 
 2004 ; Sloman,  2005 ). Tool use studies are diffi  cult to interpret in this framework for the 
reason Edwards et al. suggest: because it is hard to clearly summarize the relevant sets of 
causal relationships in terms of the sort of structures specifi ed in the causal models 
approach. We might again try to tease out what might be the sort of guiding assumption 
behind Edwards et al.’s skepticism about tool use studies in this respect. Although not 
explicitly discussed by Edwards et al., one possible candidate may be that possessing a 
causal model of a system involves representing causes as distinct from their eff ects, and 
understanding the directionality of the relationships and the dependencies and interde-
pendencies in the system. One could align this requirement with Woodward’s suggestion 
that explicit causal representations “decouple” means and ends and moreover separate 
out the representations of means themselves into the sub-component links in a causal 
chain (i.e., the intermediate steps in a causal sequence). A potential worry about tool 
use studies may be that they do not, or do straightforwardly, demonstrate that the tool 
user can separate out and represent the components of the causal system with which 
they are operating in this way. (However, see Campbell’s chapter for a characterization 
of what he calls “intelligent tool use” that recruits at least some of the theoretical ele-
ments in terms of which Woodward’s interventionist approach analyses causal systems.) 
 Facts about how tool use abilities are acquired may also raise similar issues about the 
sophistication of the abilities involved in successful tool use. First, developmentally, use 
of many familiar tools seems to be acquired gradually with repeated practice with objects 
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(see Greif and Needham’s chapter), and indeed may in some cases emerge from repeat-
ing action patterns with objects in which the objects are not initially treated as tools. 
Second, as Greif and Needham also emphasize, tool use often takes place in the context of 
particular social practices: there are social norms for how a fork or a hammer is used and a 
social consensus as to what such implements usually look like. Indeed, studies of tool use 
have extensively informed debates about the cognitive underpinnings of imitation and 
the social acquisition of knowledge in animals (e.g., Whiten et al.,  2005 ). This suggests 
that there may be a distinctive way in which causal knowledge about tools can be 
acquired that is quite diff erent from the sort of causal cognition assessed in standard 
paradigms of causal cognition. It may be tempting to suggest that if tool use is acquired 
in either of these ways — due to repeated practice with objects or due to imitation/social 
learning — what may be acquired is exactly the sort of undiff erentiated behavioral routine 
that Woodward argues falls short of explicit causal representation. On this picture, the 
obvious challenge to researchers is to show that tool users can do more than simply 
reproduce such routines. 
 1. The cognitive basis of tool use: Mechanical reasoning 
versus manipulation knowledge 
 A common theme across several chapters is that we can distinguish between diff erent 
types of tool use in terms of the cognitive resources that they draw upon, although the 
authors make this distinction in diff erent ways. The general idea that there are diff erent 
types of cognitive skills underpinning tool use is a source of considerable debate within 
the comparative literature, with diff erent researchers interpreting animals’ tool use in 
ways that vary dramatically in terms of the richness of the cognitive resources posited to 
underpin the behavior. This is also true in the developmental literature (see Lockman, 
 2000 ; Greif and Needham’s chapter in this volume). Given this, neuropsychological 
fi ndings that show dissociations in diff erent aspects of tool use are particularly interest-
ing, because they could be interpreted as providing hard evidence that there are genu-
inely diff erent ways in which cognitive resources contribute to tool use. In his chapter, 
Goldenberg makes a key distinction between tool use that may be underpinned by 
manipulation knowledge — roughly speaking, information about how a particular tool is 
typically put to use — and tool use that may be underpinned by what he terms mechanical 
reasoning.  Tool use underpinned by manipulation knowledge draws on a type of memory 
that, amongst other things, specifi es behavioral routines about how an individual tool is 
used, whereas tool use underpinned by mechanical reasoning involves what Goldenberg 
views to be a type of problem-solving in which the tool user fi gures out how the tool 
should be used given the mechanics of the situation the user fi nds themselves in. Both of 
these types of cognitive resources may come into play in everyday tool use. However, 
Goldenberg believes that there is evidence for a distinction between them: the existence 
of double dissociations between, on the one hand, patients who seem to have preserved 
manipulation knowledge, and thus have some ability to use familiar objects, but impaired 
mechanical reasoning, as shown by their lack of insight into how novel tools could 
be used, and, on the other hand, patients who seem to be most severely impaired in 
manipulation knowledge but may retain mechanical reasoning abilities. 
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 The import of Goldenberg’s use of the term “mechanical reasoning” is that human tool 
use usually goes beyond simply bringing to bear well-practiced behavioral routines that 
could potentially have been honed through a process of trial and error. Indeed, Goldenberg 
believes that novel tool use studies, in which patients are faced with a situation in which 
they have to select appropriately from a range of unfamiliar tools the correct one to per-
form a task that they have also not faced previously, are particularly interesting because 
we can examine whether patients select the correct tool before they have ever had an 
opportunity to try it out. Goldenberg’s distinction between manipulation knowledge and 
mechanical reasoning might be thought to provide a starting point for considering how 
we should interpret the tool use abilities of non-human primates and young children. For 
instance, we might want to consider the simple hypothesis that these populations possess 
manipulation knowledge, usually through a process of trial and error, rather than mechan-
ical reasoning abilities, and then consider what types of evidence would support such a 
position. Moreover, we could give this hypothesis more theoretical bite by arguing that 
only in the case of mechanical reasoning is genuine causal cognition involved. 
 However, one reading of Greif and Needham’s chapter is that such a distinction on its 
own does not capture the complex ways in which the learning of tool-specifi c actions 
and the sort of understanding that may underpin mechanical reasoning interact with 
each other in the acquisition of tool use. They portray the acquisition of tool use as 
involving an interplay between action patterns, knowledge about how a tool is usually 
used, and conceptual knowledge about object properties that could be used to reason about 
tools. As they point out, through repeated action with a tool children can actually 
generate data that are suitable for serving as the input to such conceptual knowledge. 
That is, they argue that it is through hands-on experience with tools that children 
become sensitive to the particular physical properties that underpin successful tool use. 
However, Greif and Needham also argue that the relationship between such knowledge 
and action is more complex and bidirectional than this simple picture. For example, they 
observe that it is only with development that children seem to reliably and appropri-
ately repeat a successful action with a tool, and suggest that even generating appropriate 
repetitions effi  ciently (which would presumably provide further useful data for the 
child) may already depend upon representing the relationship between tool and object 
in a way that is not available to younger children. Moreover, they argue that although 
this effi  cient reproduction of successful actions may lead to a rigidity that initially con-
strains tool use (as evidenced, for example, in the child’s reluctance to use a spoon in a 
novel way), this constrained use of tools leads to children producing more selective and 
focused actions, which in turn allows them to pay attention to and fi lter out the exact 
properties of the tool and target necessary for successful tool use. Thus, on Greif and 
Needham’s picture, this initial rigid use of behavioral routines ultimately facilitates 
the conceptual knowledge that they believe allows generalization of tool use to novel 
contexts and the ability to use novel tools. This is not to say that Greif and Needham do 
not want to characterize the developmental end-point of tool use as involving some-
thing similar to what Goldenberg describes as mechanical reasoning. However, they 
do not see a simple one-way developmental progression from the learning of action 
routines to mechanical reasoning. 
 One implication of the arguments in Peacocke’s chapter is also that it may be mis-
leading to think of the crucial psychological distinction in terms of a distinction between 
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rigid behavioral routines and mechanical reasoning, as described so far.   The key distinc-
tion that Peacocke himself argues for is one between tool use that may be underpinned 
by a grasp of sets of conditional goal–action pairs (i.e., rules such as “To get G, do A”) and 
tool use that may involve a genuine grasp of causal relationships. As he argues, the sort of 
behavior that may be explicable by possession of such rules goes far beyond what we 
would consider as infl exible behavioral routines. This is because he thinks of such rules 
as potentially embedded in conditionals (e.g., “When C holds, to get G, do A; when D 
holds, to get G, do E”), and indeed these conditions could even make reference to object 
properties (e.g., be of the form “When C is rigid, to get G, do A”). He suggests that such 
rules could be combined and used to reach solutions in a way that would appear to be 
creative, without yet being underpinned by any genuine grasp of causal notions. Thus, 
on his picture, a simple distinction between manipulation knowledge and mechanical 
reasoning does not seem to capture the possible range of explanations of behavior that 
we may wish to make use of in describing the cognitive abilities underpinning tool use. 
For a start, on his picture, manipulation knowledge could vary dramatically in terms of 
the complexity of the rules that underpin it (one issue that may be of relevance here is 
that some developmental psychologists argue that children are not capable of dealing 
with embedded conditional rules until around four years of age; Frye et al.,  1996 ). 
Moreover, Peacocke’s position also allows for a sense in which tool use, especially inno-
vative tool use, might be said to involve reasoning but without necessarily involving 
causal cognition; we discuss in the next section what he takes to be necessary for causal 
cognition. 
 The general idea that we can distinguish between types of tool use that involve diff erent 
levels of cognitive sophistication appears again in Campbell’s chapter, which attempts to 
characterize intelligent tool use. The key distinction he makes is between tool use that is 
grounded in an awareness of what he terms the relevant standing properties of the tool 
at hand, and tool use that may involve a sensitivity to the covariation between one’s 
actions with the tool and outcomes, but is not grounded in such an awareness. By “the 
relevant standing properties” here, Campbell means the physical properties of the tool 
by virtue of which it can bring about the desired changes in the object or surface that 
one is trying to transform by using the tool, properties such as its weight, solidity, and 
sharpness. We could immediately hypothesize that it is the kinds of awareness Campbell 
has in mind here that seems to be missing in some of the most severely impaired patients 
Goldenberg describes: not only do they not seem to know, e.g., how a knife is used 
(manipulation knowledge), or what it is usually for (functional knowledge), they don’t 
seem to have any sense of what could be done with an object of this sort.  As he also puts 
it, even saying that those patients act as if they had never used the relevant tools before 
does not get to the bottom of the issue.  A person who had never used a knife before but 
had some awareness of its causally relevant properties would not try to cut a loaf of bread 
by pressing the knife into it without moving it to and fro, as those patients will do. 
 Campbell points out that intelligent tool use does not just  “demand that you somehow 
have an internalized manual for the correct use of the tool, guiding your actions,” and 
Goldenberg could agree on this point. Where the two accounts appear to diff er is on 
exactly how to characterize what more is involved in more sophisticated tool use. In his 
use of the term ‘mechanical reasoning’, Goldenberg seems to be suggesting something 
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akin to an inferential process, whereby the tool user is not just aware of the properties of 
the tool, but engages in a chain of reasoning about the implications of these properties. 
Campbell explicitly denies that we need assume any type of reasoning process here, or 
indeed that the intelligent tool user need to be in possession of a “theory” about the 
causal signifi cance of the properties. On his account, what makes tool use intelligent is 
whether in actually making use of the tool, the user has the appropriate awareness of its 
properties. This awareness will typically entail that various types of behavior, beyond 
rigid behavioral routines, are possible for the tool user (we will return to this issue 
below). However, for Campbell, in exploiting this awareness the tool user is emphatically 
not reasoning. Rather, he argues, there are direct-wired connections between use of 
the tool and awareness of the relevant object properties: there is a direct dependency 
between this awareness and the pattern of tool use itself in that one simply causes the 
other. This raises interesting developmental issues about how such a direct dependency 
may arise that link with those discussed by Greif and Needham. Note specifi cally that 
Campbell uses the term “direct-wired” rather than “hard-wired,” which allows for the 
possibility that the direct dependency between awareness of the relevant properties and 
patterns of tool use is something that can emerge, perhaps as a result of the sort of interplay 
between acquisition of action patterns and sensitivity to functionally relevant properties 
that Greif and Needham describe. 
 To sum up, although the neuropsychological literature described by Goldenberg could 
be used as a basis for suggesting a core distinction between manipulation knowledge and 
mechanical reasoning, where only the latter is viewed as involving causal cognition, 
whether this is the only or the most useful way to distinguish between two cognitive 
bases for tool use is a matter of debate amongst the chapters’ authors. Moreover, these 
considerations raise the general issue of whether it is potentially unhelpful to think of 
there just being one sense in which tool use may involve causal cognition. 
 2. Causal cognition: Unitary or multidimensional? 
 Campbell himself is trying to draw out the diff erence between intelligent and non- 
intelligent tool use, and does not address the question as to in what sense specifi cally 
causal cognition is involved in tool use. The hypothesis that tool use may be guided by a 
grasp of rules describing links between goals and actions rather than genuine causal 
understanding is what Peacocke terms the “austere hypothesis,” and, as we have mentioned, 
he gives a number of examples of what might look like fairly sophisticated behavior that 
may nevertheless be describable in terms of conditional rule use. On Peacocke’s account, 
one basic way in which tool use may go beyond merely exploiting such rules is if it is 
informed by beliefs that have a counterfactual fl avor, i.e., if the agent does A to get G, in 
part because of a belief that he will not get G if he does not do A. Moreover, though, 
what is critically important for Peacocke is that the tool user who has a grasp of causal 
notions will understand  why such beliefs hold, i.e., by virtue of which explanatory prop-
erties it is the case that doing A is followed by G and not doing A is not followed by G. 
That is, where tool use involves causal understanding, the tool user is committed to 
there being an explanation of the connection between their action and the outcome in 
terms of properties that in fact underpin the connection. 
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 Thus, although he believes that some types of tool use are indeed underpinned by 
causal understanding, Peacocke argues against the assumption, discussed extensively by 
many researchers (e.g., Penn & Povinelli,  2007 ; Taylor et al.,  2009 ; Visalberghi & 
Tomasello,  1998 ), that tool use behavior can serve as evidence for a grasp of causality. 
As he puts it, “[e]ven creative and ingenious uses of tools can be explained without any 
attribution of grasp of causality.” Rather, demonstrating a grasp of causality, on Peacocke’s 
view, is, at least in part, a matter of demonstrating that the subject has particular beliefs as 
to why there is a connection between how it acts and whether it achieves its goals. For 
Peacocke, such beliefs turn on a grasp of the causal role of properties such as heaviness, 
resistance, and force, as provided by an intuitive mechanics. In other words, demonstrat-
ing that the subject holds such beliefs is a matter of showing that it can engage in a 
particular kind of explanation, e.g., as to why use of a given tool can bring about the 
intended eff ect, rather than simply the fact of tool use (or even manufacture; e.g., 
Kenward et al.,  2005 ; Weir & Kacelnik,  2006 ) itself. Connectedly, Peacocke takes as being 
particularly revealing of a grasp of causality a circumstance in which a subject would be 
surprised on being shown that the mechanism underpinning the connection between 
two events was other than might be expected, thus showing that the subject did work 
under the assumption of an underlying mechanism of a particular sort. By contrast, a 
subject who only possessed goal–action rules would have no grounds for being sur-
prised in this type of circumstance. 
 The idea that, in interpreting tool use, it is important to consider what, if any, type of 
explanatory reasoning the tool user is capable of engaging in also appears in Povinelli 
and Penn’s chapter. These authors claim that non-human primates may not just fail to be 
committed to particular explanations of the success of their actions, but moreover that 
they diff er from humans fundamentally in that they simply do not consider the issue of 
why some actions are successful and other are not — an ability Povinelli and Penn refer 
to as diagnostic causal reasoning. 1 For example, they mention one study in which human 
children but not chimpanzees try hard to fi nd out why a particular wooden block 
(covertly weighted off -center by the experimenter) would not stand up. In this study, 
chimpanzees simply continued to try to make the block stand up, whereas 3-year-olds 
explored the block in various ways to try to diagnose the problem. 
 As we have seen, Peacocke describes this kind of grasp of the explanatory value of 
properties as part of an intuitive mechanics. His claim that the counterfactual beliefs 
associated with a grasp of causality must be rooted in possession of an intuitive mechanics 
can be contrasted with the view Woodward explores in his chapter. Interestingly, 
Woodward argues that it is not helpful to assume that there is a single sense in which 
cognition can be described as causal. Rather, he suggests that a geometrical-mechanical 
grasp of causation (which we might spell out in terms of possession of an intuitive 
mechanics) and a diff erence-making grasp of causation (with which we might align 
with a grasp of certain counterfactuals) may each capture quite diff erent aspects of causal 
cognition. Indeed, he argues that the two are distinct from one another in that it may be 
1  Indeed, we note that Edwards et al. also believe this to be a core human/animal diff erence. 
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perfectly possible to possess appropriate diff erence-making knowledge without it being 
underpinned by geometrical-mechanical knowledge, or vice versa, and in either of 
these cases it would still be correct to describe such knowledge as causal. One important 
idea that he elaborates in his chapter is that although these two types of causal cognition 
may be well integrated and meshed in mature humans — i.e., adult humans typically 
appreciate the relevance of geometrical-mechanical information for beliefs about 
diff erence-making relationships, and the relevance of information about diff erence-
making relationships for beliefs about the existence of mechanisms — it is perfectly 
possible that this is not the case in all species. Thus, he argues that although it may seem 
initially plausible to explain any defi ciencies observed in animal tool use in terms of, for 
example, a lack of the appropriate geometrical-mechanical understanding, it is equally 
plausible to assume that these defi ciencies may result from a failure to properly integrate 
diff erence-making and geometrical-mechanical knowledge. He argues that such a failure 
to properly integrate these types of knowledge could also show up in contexts in which 
animals or human infants seem able to detect the relevant geometrical-mechanical 
properties, as measured in, for example, looking-time tasks, but unable to use those 
properties to appropriately guide their actions. 
 For Woodward, not only may diff erent groups diff er in terms of how well integrated 
these two strands of knowledge may be, but the sophistication of each of these strands 
of knowledge could also vary across groups: for example, geometrical-mechanical 
knowledge may vary in how complete it is, and diff erence-making knowledge may vary 
in terms of which sources the subject is able to acquire it from (e.g., just from their own 
actions, or from observation). Thus, on Woodward’s picture, causal cognition is genu-
inely multidimensional, and the challenge to researchers conducting tool use studies is 
to fi gure out the status of tool use behaviors in terms of the various dimensions he 
specifi es. One straightforward implication of his multidimensional approach is that in 
painting a picture of the causal competence of any group or species, we would need to 
consider the fi ndings of tool use studies alongside the fi ndings of studies using a wide 
variety of other paradigms. 
 3. Generalizing and generalizability 
 Animal researchers, such as those working with non-human primates, may fi nd 
Woodward’s approach daunting because it suggests that it may not be advisable to try to 
identify a single general diff erence between human and animal cognition. To some 
extent, this runs contrary to the approach taken by many comparative psychologists. For 
instance, Povinelli and Penn believe that non-human primates diff er fundamentally 
in terms of the repertoire of concepts they possess, arguing that only humans possess 
concepts suffi  cient for underpinning diagnostic causal reasoning — causal reasoning in 
which the reasoner seeks explanations as to why the regularities that they encounter 
occur. Seed and colleagues, in their chapter, discuss empirical evidence that they believe 
contradicts Povinelli and Penn’s claims about the conceptual repertoire of animals and 
put forward an alternative, but similarly global, view of what they see as the one key 
diff erence between human and animal cognition. 
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 The positions put forward by Povinelli and Penn and by Seed and colleagues diff er 
sharply; thus it may be useful to try to describe in neutral and general terms what the 
two sets of authors appear to agree on: 2 
 (1) Engaging in genuinely causal reasoning about the physical world necessarily 
requires possession of certain types of concepts about objects and their interactions. 
 (2)  These concepts are in some sense “abstractions” of perceptual properties. 
 (3)  These concepts enable the subject to produce a range of tool use behaviors in a 
way that generalizes across contexts in an important sense; behavior not based on 
such concepts is not generalized in this way. 
 What seems to make the debate between these authors diffi  cult is that what each 
takes to be the lower level alternative explanation of animal behavior is diff erent. On 
Seed and colleagues’s picture, the relevant distinction is between possessing arbitrary 
links between responses and perceptual properties of a scenario that are not themselves 
functionally relevant and possessing what they call structural knowledge, in which 
action can be based on the encoding of functionally relevant properties (such as weight 
or length). On this picture, animals operating at the lower level would fail to be sensitive 
to these functionally relevant properties, and Seed and colleagues argue that there is an 
abundance of evidence from their own studies that there are at least some animals, 
including both non-human primates and corvids, that do show such sensitivity and 
indeed distinguish between arbitrary and functionally relevant properties. In other 
words, animals operating at the lower level, as Seed and colleagues understand it, could 
not possess representations of object properties such as heaviness or fl oppiness. However, 
Seed and colleagues also believe that animals are not in fact restricted to that lower level. 
 Povinelli and Penn, on the other hand, take the lower level explanation to be one in 
which animals can do more than simply pick up arbitrary perceptual regularities. Rather, 
they can indeed be sensitive to properties such as heaviness that are functionally relevant, 
and can treat functionally relevant properties as diff erent from functionally irrelevant ones, 
although they may require appropriate repeated experience to tune into the functionally 
relevant properties. Moreover they believe that it would not be incoherent to describe 
the animals as reasoning with these representations rather than simply producing infl exible 
behavioral routines linked to perceptual features of scenarios. However, Povinelli and 
Penn believe that there is nevertheless still an important sense in which the representations 
animals are using are more perceptually bound and less abstract than those of humans. 
Seed and colleagues believe this too, but they believe that animals’ diffi  culties lie with 
understanding symbolic representations (i.e., that one stimulus can stand for or symbolize 
something else). Thus, the two sets of authors diff er in terms of what they take to be the 
correct distinctions to make between the alternative types of knowledge and thus not 
surprisingly diff er in terms of whether they wish to describe non-human primates as 
operating at the lower level. 
2  As we have seen, a view such as Woodward’s might be seen as presenting a way of challenging the very way 
in which the debate is being set up here. 
01-McCormack-Ch-01.indd   12 8/9/2011   9:33:03 AM
tool use and causal cognition: an introduction 13
 A large part of the diffi  culty here lies in the inherent vagueness of the notion of an 
abstract concept, with Povinelli and Penn, for example, arguing that there could be a 
way of representing and reasoning about a notion such as weight that is not as abstract as 
that used by humans, and Seed and colleagues arguing that being able to represent and 
reason about weight already involves abstracting beyond perceptual cues. Thus, at its 
most basic level, resolving their debate is a matter of dealing with very hard questions 
about what it is to possess concepts of certain types and in what sense concept possession 
involves generalizing beyond what is given in perception. Nevertheless, it seems to us 
that these authors need not necessarily disagree on every aspect of their characterization of 
non-human primate abilities. Specifi cally, Povinelli and Penn argue not just that animals 
do not possess a certain repertoire of concepts. As we saw already, they also argue for a 
key diff erence in how humans and animals exploit their knowledge of the world: ani-
mals are concerned with successful action, but they do not engage in diagnostic causal 
reasoning, reasoning aimed at uncovering why some actions are successful and others 
are not. Povinelli and Penn assume that these two defi cits are in some sense two sides of 
the same coin:  The assumption seems to be that uncovering explanations for successful 
or unsuccessful action is a matter of discovering exactly the sort of properties underpin-
ning these actions that Povinelli and Penn believe animals have no concepts of. However, 
it is at least possible that Seed and colleagues could agree with Povinelli and Penn, if not 
in terms of what concepts animals do or do not possess, but in terms of animals’ basic 
mode of applying their knowledge. That is, they could potentially agree that animals do 
not engage in diagnostic causal reasoning: in Povinelli and Penn’s terms, they could 
agree that chimps never ask “why?,” even if they think that chimps do possess some sort 
of abstract concepts. 
 As mentioned earlier, both sets of authors also take it to be important to examine 
empirically the extent to which the behavior an animal acquires is appropriately gener-
alized to new contexts (see also Greif and Needham’s chapter for a discussion of this 
issue in a developmental context), and here they seem to at least implicitly assume that 
generalizability may be an all-or-nothing ability that hinges again on either possessing 
or not possessing appropriately abstract representations of object properties. Roughly, 
the idea seems to be that the relevant concepts themselves generalize across situations in 
which quite diff erent perceptual features are present, and because of this, an animal 
needs to possess such concepts to generalize their behavior across these contexts. 
Woodward’s chapter already provides some alternative ways of thinking about general-
izability in animal behavior: for example, in terms of how well diff erence-making and 
geometrical-mechanical knowledge are integrated, or in terms of whether animals can 
generalize across not just their own behavior over time but also across their own actions 
and actions they have observed others perform. If we turn to Campbell’s chapter, we can 
also see a discussion of generalizability that allows for diff erent degrees of generalizability 
and diff erent ways in which generalizability may be limited. 
 Recall that Campbell’s question is what constitutes intelligent tool use. For him, this 
question turns on whether tool use is underpinned by an awareness of the standing 
properties of the tool and its target (hardness, rigidity, etc.), and he points out that we 
should expect tool use behavior to display a certain amount of systematicity if it is 
underpinned by such awareness. On one way of reading Campbell, what he has in mind 
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here is basically the same as what we have called generalizability in the above discussion 
of Seed and colleagues, and of Povinelli and Penn. Yet, Campbell’s position is very 
diff erent from theirs in at least two quite crucial respects. 
 First, on Campbell’s view, there may be a linear spectrum of tool use behaviors that 
vary according to the extent to which they involve and are grounded in awareness of 
particular standing properties of the tool and the target. In fact, Campbell goes on to 
distinguish between three diff erent dimensions along which we could distinguish dif-
ferent levels of generality in an animal’s grasp of the bearing such properties might have 
on tool use: 
 (1) Animals may vary in the  breadth of properties of a system that they are aware of and 
that underpin their tool use; 
 (2) There may be insuffi  cient  spread in the range of behaviors that are underpinned 
by such awareness, so that although the animal may appreciate the importance of all 
the relevant standing properties in one task, they do not invariably appropriately 
generalize across tasks contexts; and 
 (3) They may not be  systematic in how they make use of their awareness of standing 
properties, such that although they may appreciate the signifi cance of a property 
of a tool for successful action, they may fail to realize that systematic variations of the 
value of this property may be required if the value of a dimension of the problem 
context also varies. 
 Thus, like Woodward, Campbell’s approach diff ers from that found both in Seed and 
colleagues and in Povinelli and Penn, in that Campbell argues for a multidimensional 
approach to considering the sophistication of tool use. 
 The second important point of divergence is one we have come across previously. 
Recall that Campbell does not think that the awareness of the standing properties of 
a tool and its target on which intelligent tool use turns, and which grounds the general-
izability of tool use along diff erent dimensions, must involve the ability to engage in 
reasoning, e.g., about how the standing properties of a tool are connected to what can 
be done with it. Thus, not only is his account multidimensional in the way just sketched, 
it also diff ers from the approach adopted by both Povinelli and Penn and Seed and col-
leagues in separating out the question as to whether a subject can generalize tool use, 
e.g., to new contexts and the question as to whether that subject can engage in diagnostic 
or explanatory reasoning. 
 4. Tool use and the body 
 We fi nish this introduction by briefl y considering how the issues discussed in the chapters 
by Spence and by Cardinali et al. may link to the issues discussed in the other chapters. 
As we mentioned earlier, many researchers take as their working defi nition of a tool as 
being an “extension of the body that expands the functional range of a limb” (see Greif and 
Needham; it is highly unlikely that these authors would deny there are complex tools that 
do not easily fall under this defi nition; however, they take the interesting developmental 
questions to arise from examining the more basic cases in which this defi nition holds). 
We can look at Spence’s and Cardinali et al.’s chapters to examine whether thinking 
01-McCormack-Ch-01.indd   14 8/9/2011   9:33:03 AM
tool use and causal cognition: an introduction 15
about tools as extensions of the body is not just useful for defi nitional purposes or as a 
metaphor, but has a concrete psychological and neurological truth to it. 
 These two chapters discuss a wide variety of evidence from neuropsychology, neuro-
physiology, and experimental psychology for the hypothesis that tool use can lead to 
alterations in how the body is represented or in how attention is distributed relative to 
the body (or both). These alterations are specifi c to tool use: such alterations are not 
produced by moving an object that isn’t a tool or by moving a tool without intending 
to use it. As Cardinali et al. discuss, one way of interpreting these fi ndings is in terms of 
the idea that using a tool alters the body schema: put simply, the tool temporarily 
becomes represented as part of the body during its use. However, Spence argues that the 
fi ndings are potentially consistent with an alternative view which he refers to as an 
attentional account: rather than modifying how space is represented, tool use modifi es 
how likely a region of space is to attract attention or the extent to which a specifi c 
region of space is prioritized for attention. 
 Why might the question as to which interpretation of the experimental fi ndings is 
appropriate be relevant to the debates about tool use we have described so far? One 
answer to this question is hinted at by Cardinali et al. toward the end of their chapter. 
They sketch the suggestion that, in evolutionary terms, tool use was initially under-
pinned by a process whereby tools became incorporated into the body schema. They 
portray this process as operating at a level below what we would normally describe as 
involving thinking or conscious cognition, and argue that with evolution the use of 
tools became underpinned by more sophisticated cognitive processes. Thus, although 
they believe that both human and animal tool use may be associated with changes to the 
body schema, they argue that human tool use typically involves additional cognitive 
processes. Although this proposal is sketched only briefl y, it suggests an intriguing pos-
sible depiction of animal tool use: that animal tool use diff ers from that of mature humans 
in that it  relies on a process whereby tools become incorporated into the body schema 
(see Johnson-Frey,  2003 , for the related suggestion, based on neurological evidence, that 
animal tool use relies on purely sensorimotor representations). What is appealing about 
this notion is that it suggests that tool use may be primitive in that it simply piggy-backs 
on the animal’s pre-existing motor skills — its ability to manipulate its own limbs in 
eff ective ways. This would clearly fall short of what Woodward, for instance, describes as 
the sort of tool use that involves causal cognition: tool use that involves representations 
in which means are decoupled from ends and in which intermediate links in the causal 
chain of means to ends are also potentially separated out. Moreover, we might expect 
animals to have diffi  culty generalizing tool use behaviors appropriately: for example, 
generalization to a new context may involve a diff erent way of using the tool as a bodily 
extension and thus not be straightforward. And there would also be no reason to suppose 
that animals that are treating a tool as an extension of their body could easily recognize 
which properties of the tool itself are necessary for it to function appropriately. If this 
depiction of more primitive tool use were correct — i.e., as reliant on the tool becoming 
incorporated into the body schema — then it might suggest that there is nothing special 
about tool use per se that means we should treat it as an indicator of causal cognition. 
Tool use would thus potentially involve nothing more complex than is required for any 
of the other ways of negotiating the physical world that the animal has at its disposal. 
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 Clearly, more work is required in spelling out what exactly this claim would amount 
to, and in establishing whether it is credible. For a start, as already mentioned, Spence 
argues in his chapter that the relevant fi ndings do not establish that tool use alters the 
body schema itself. Instead tool use may alter how we represent the space around us 
(e.g., as being near or far from our bodies). Thus, for example, he points to evidence that 
suggests that tool use results not in peripersonal space being extended (because a limb is 
now represented as being longer, as a body schema account would hold) but rather as pro-
jected to far space (because a region of distant space is selectively re-coded as being nearer 
to one’s body).   As he discusses, resolving this issue empirically is not straightforward. 
 Moreover, even if we accept that tool use is associated with changes to the body 
schema itself, to our knowledge none of the experimental fi ndings discussed in the 
chapters prove that changes in the body schema play a causal role in tool use. That is, it is 
a further question whether tool use  depends upon or is facilitated by such changes in 
spatial representation. Indeed, the research that originally sparked much of the recent 
interest in this topic merely suggested that such changes might occur as  consequence of 
tool use rather than underpinning it (e.g., see Spence’s discussion of Irki et al.’s  1996 
study). Yet, even if it is still an open question as to what sort of empirical evidence would 
clearly demonstrate that tool use is associated with changes in the body schema, and that 
these actually play a key role in tool use, the research reviewed by Cardinali et al. and by 
Spence clearly points to an important direction for further debate about which cognitive 
resources underpin tool use and what forms of causal cognition, if any, diff erent types of 
tool use require. 
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